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Abstract: 
This paper is prompted by the recent spate of violence in north India instigated by khap 
panchayats, or caste councils, and the judicial and public outrage over the resurgence of 
an older form of popular justice. Though the current challenge to state’s juridical 
authority bears an uncanny resemblance to a similar deadlock between caste-councils 
and state law witnessed in the same region nearly a hundred years ago, there are vital 
differences in the way distance from culture in law is accounted for by the colonial state 
and in postcolonial jurisprudence. In excavating the genealogy of the present impasse, 
the paper argues that at the heart of this deadlock is the unresolved nature of the 
culture question in postcolonial India, and its unanticipated and unrecognised effects. A 
counterfactual reading of two landmark pieces of legislation, the Hindu Marriage Act of 
1955 and the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 goes beyond discovering the possibilities 
scripted by the new laws. The two Acts entail a comprehensive rewriting of the 
grammar of relationality in north India, and in doing so place new constraints on culture 
particularly in the domain of kinship. The conflicts they give rise to, such as the recent 
khap violence, cannot simply be understood by transposing insights from analogous 
https://doi.org/10.18742/pub01-040 
 
This is an open access work published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 2 
conflicts in Euro-American jurisprudence because of the unique nature of the public 
aspirations of law in India. The paper strongly argues for a shift in the language within 
which the relationship between law and culture is cast in order to gain any new 
purchase on one of the oldest debates in anthropology. 
 
Suggested citation: Kapila, K (2020) Unpopular Justice: Law and the Inexpediency of 
Culture in North India. King’s College London. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18742/pub01-
040. 
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Introduction  
“[T]he people when they grew accustomed to new laws and new procedures did not 
retain their love for the panchayat […] Courts of conciliation were no longer 
popular in the Punjab as soon as there were tribunals of another nature to which 
men could turn, and they are not likely to be successful again in the future as they 
do not appear […] to be suited to the character of the people. A suitor does not wish 
to agree with his adversary, but to get the better of him if he can.” (Sir Robert 
Egerton, Secretary to the Government of India, 17th September 1880)i  
In recent years, India has seen a renewed conflict between its new laws and its older 
forms and forums of justice, sometimes resulting in acts of gross violence and 
inhumanity. One of the most spectacular of these conflicts has been the challenge posed 
by the rise of violence perpetrated at the behest of caste councils as a form of blood 
justice.  In recent years these caste councils have focused almost entirely on policing the 
boundaries of matrimonial alliances and have successfully handed out violent 
retribution to those who have married across the caste/dalit divide, or indeed within 
proscribed degrees of lineal separation. This runaway form of justice and its 
efficaciousness gained predictable opprobrium and unprecedented support in equal 
measure in media and scholarly attention [See Dogra 2013; Baxi, et al ?? ].  This paper is 
prompted by the rise of khap panchayats and this older form and forum of justice in 
recent years to investigate an long standing problem in modern India – that between 
law and culture.  
Khap panchayats are local bodies composed of caste elders that have been traditional 
forums of justice in north India that adjudicate on local and domestic disputes. Each 
major sub-lineal exogamous group has a khap (or a representative body formed of its 
elder males). In many ways, thus khaps can also be seen as a technology to make visible 
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the cartography of alliance among middle-castes in the region.  they have become 
extremely a 
In March 2010, a Sessions Court in Karnal, Haryana awarded the death penalty to five 
persons for the murder of Manoj (23 years) and Babli (19 years) in 2007. Manoj and 
Babli had been brutally killed by their kin at the orders of a khap panchayat (or a council 
of caste elders) for marrying within the same gotra or sub-caste. ii The Karnal court 
passed the death-sentence for five members of Babli’s family for carrying out the 
murders, and a life sentence for the head of the khap panchayat who had ordered the 
killings (Sharma 2010).  
The court judgement and the ensuing meeting in Kurukshetra were new salvos from 
two old foes in a bid to break out of a deadlock that had been festering for more than 
two years. In the course of this time, a growing number of young men and women have 
been killed by their kin at the behest of similar diktats issued by caste-elders as 
retribution against mis-marriages between men and women either of the same gotra 
(lineal sub-caste), and/or village, or across the dalit divide. Through the Karnal court 
judgement, the state had finally showed a categorical sign of disapprobation for this 
form of runaway justice. The Kurukshetra meeting proved to be so popular so that in the 
next few months, several such congregations were convened. Here, thousands of 
ordinary and not-so-ordinary men and women from across the north Indian plains 
gathered as members or supporters of caste-councils, giving further evidence to the 
growing unassailability of these khaps. 
Both the killings of young men and women and the supporting congregations or khap-
mahapanchayats attracted a fair deal of media frenzy and have become the subject of 
growing scholarly attention (eg. Baxi, Rai and Ali 2006; Chowdhry 2007; Kaur 2010). In 
a curious development, the spate of murders gave to the swift import of the appellation 
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of ‘honour killings’ in media and popular representations. This was perhaps as a nod to 
the global imaginary in which India exists not only as a dominant economic player, but 
also one in which India too is plagued by the same irritant as its global comrades – that 
is, by certain lumpy bits of culture, not those that make for ‘heritage’ but those that 
ostensibly lead to clashes of civilisational proportions.  
Culture in this instance was identified with caste and scholarly, journalistic and civil 
society attention elaborated on the underlying caste and gender dynamics that inform 
this brutal form of popular justice in north India (Baxi, et al 2006; Dogra 2010; Kaur 
2010; Reddy 2010). In most of these accounts, the persistence of an older jurisprudence 
was seen to be epiphenomenal of an underlying obduracy of a region to become 
‘progressive’ and its inability to inculcate desired social reform (Reddy 2010). 
Commenting on the phenomenon in the national press, historian Prem Chowdhry said, 
‘[y]ou cannot do away with [khaps] because they are old institutions, but I would 
suggest that they take the reformist agenda (sic) […] khaps have to reform’, highlighting 
at once the reading of the situation even by the regional expert through a premium of 
change (Reddy 2010; emphasis added).  This was particularly curious given that 
Chowdhry has herself noted the shifting interests of the khaps in the course of the last 
century, including their once patently reformist concerns such as  opprobrium against 
lavish expenditures at weddings and/or demands for exorbitant dowry.  
‘After Independence, different cases and got panchayats held in different villages 
and several khap and sarv-khap panchayats of different caste groups have been 
making similar attempts to curb [dowry, and lavish expenditure on weddings]. 
Several resolutions have been passed imposing heavy fines (as high as Rs 
11,000) on all those breaking traditional norms and excommunicating them. All 
these have proved fruitless. The so-called biradari leaders, who think it a matter 
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of pride and status to spend lavishly at marriages, have no observed such 
decisions. (Chowdhry 2007: 260) 
She further observes,  
It is significant that in the colonial period these […] leaders had activated caste 
reform movement in their move towards upward mobility. In the postcolonial 
period, the same affluent groups are apparently still theoretically committed to 
purging the worst social abuses.’ (Chowdhry 2007: 260-61) 
For Chowdhry, reform is merely a matter of political expediency. In the 2010 interview, 
she argues that khap leaders have abandoned the reformist agenda because it no longer 
brings any political purchase for them. She reads their adoption of stricter observance of 
caste strictures as an expeditious route to influencing popular sentiment ‘because it’s an 
emotive issue on which they can mobilise’ (Reddy 2010). However, no explanation is 
needed either by the interviewer nor indeed offered by Chowdhry, as to how or why 
stricture has come to entail an emotional appeal for some in north India. 
As is evident from the trajectory of the concerns outlined by Chowdhry, the rise of khaps 
in the last few years is not due to an obduracy of a culture that refuses to change – were 
that to be true for any culture. Rather, the recent ascendance of khaps and their 
efficacious violence is precisely a result of a tectonic shift in local society and culture, 
none of which was either cognised or anticipated. The clue to this shift lies in the choice 
of adversary singled out by the khaps. Caste patriarchs had not identified romantic love, 
nor indeed individual choice as the root-cause of their outrage, as has been hastily (and 
erroneously) surmised by commentators and critics. In specifying the Hindu Marriage 
Act (1955), and in specific the sub-clause pertaining to the same-gotra (sub-lineage) 
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marriage, these councils have declared substantive state law as their direct adversary, 
indicting it for making possibilities that were not scripted within culture.   
The state on its part made it amply clear that it was in not going to entertain this 
demand for amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act, not least because its unwillingness 
to share its juridical authority, even if it made for political discomfort. Mirroring the 
actions of the khaps, the state too handed death sentences to those who were seen to 
dispute its juridical supremacy, in this case Manoj and Babli’s killers. Thus, an old battle 
between law and culture has once again been stoked. Its vintage however has trapped 
the current debate in familiar and rehearsed domains, both from within (for example, in 
comparisons with the battle between tradition and modernity in colonial law), and 
without (as exemplified in terming the murders as ‘honour killings’). These inferences 
are not wrong in themselves; however, in order to enable a reframing of the relationship 
between law and culture that does not repeat older epistemological disadvantages, it is 
imperative to move away from legacy understandings. 
 
Law’s culture 
The contest between cultural and legal norms is not unique to India, and in fact forms 
the bedrock of identity politics that scholars from divergent traditions and persuasion 
have written about extensively.iii Whilst the inseparability of law from culture is 
undisputed, there remain significant differences in how the relationship is understood 
and explained in different contexts. Euro-Americanist social-legal scholarship tends to 
subsume the two into one on the grounds of a purported consensus between law and 
culture, in that law is but a codification and reinscription of everyday values, life-ways, 
or in other words, culture (Merry 1990: 62; Ewick and Silbey 1998: 43; Mezey 2001: 36; 
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Sarat and Simon 2003; Silbey 2005: 332). The tension between the two domains is 
acknowledged and understood by some to originate in the force of state power behind 
law (Derrida 1990; Peletz 2002; Supiot 2007). This tension gains new life-form every 
now and then, and its most recent manifestations have been the debates surrounding 
the illegalisation of the head-scarf in France (Scott 2008; Sunder 2003), or the conflict 
between notions of human rights and certain cultural practices, eg. female circumcision 
amongst certain African communities living in Europe (Benhabib 2005; Merry 2006). In 
these accounts, the gap between law and culture in the Euro-American context is 
sourced to cultural heterogeneity that has arisen from the fact of immigration. That is to 
say, normative difference is understood to emerge, if not lie outside of society.  
The scholarship on the relationship between law and culture in Euro-America, whilst 
important and insightful, is ultimately of limited use in understanding the relationship 
between culture and law in India for two reasons in the main: first, because unlike Euro-
American law, it is arguable to what extent state law in India draws on everyday social 
values. In fact, it may be more accurate to say that in India, legal and cultural norms far 
from coincide. Therefore, the subject of law and that of culture broadly defined often 
appear in contradistinction with each other. The relationship between the two is not 
necessarily, or always, one of hostility. Rather, as the quote at the beginning of the paper 
well illustrates, the public aspirations of law in India are aimed at attaining the eventual 
coincidence of the two in the future. Secondly, the source of heterogeneity between 
cultural and legal norms in most multicultural states in Euro-America is seen to be 
located in an externality or a separation achieved in the fact of either settler colonialism 
(eg. Aborigine rights in Australia, First Nations theory in North America)iv, or through 
immigration (most work on Islamic radicalism ranging from the Salman Rushdie fatwa 
to the illegality of the headscarf in France)v. Therefore, it is minimally plausible in these 
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contexts to constitute ‘culture’ as a problem, when culture stands in as shorthand for 
normative heterogeneity. In India however, cultural difference is seen intrinsic to the 
self-image of society in India. ‘Unity In Diversity’ is the most oft repeated state slogan 
and it is law that is seen to have the position of the émigré.vi  
This distinctive nature of the relationship between law and culture in India has thus far 
been inadequately explored.  Situations such as the current détente between the khaps 
and the state judiciary tend to become natural citizens of ‘analytical subcultures’ 
(Strathern 1981: 670) such as legal pluralism, and often fall prey to our habits of 
thinking about these domains. Through a counterfactual reading of the relationship 
between law and culture in contemporary India, I want to explore the constitution of 
culture as a problem, an impediment in the work of law, in two distinct moments in 
north India and its implications for understanding cultural and legal subjectivity in India 
today.  
 
Recognition 
The current conflict between state law and popular justice bears an uncanny 
resemblance to a contest the region witnessed through the second half of the 19th 
century. The north Indian plains posed a special problem to the colonial state with 
respect to the question of law, both in terms of the rules by which people lived their 
lives as well as the processes and in particular institutions for dispute settlement. For 
the best part of fifty years following the annexation of Punjab in 1846, the then colonial 
state vacillated on how to contain the influence of local councils and custom and gain 
force and authority behind its own laws (Kapila 2003). From 1846 to 1899, the colonial 
government in Punjab went back and forth on the legal recognition of local juridical 
institutions, or village panchayats. These councils of village elders adjudicated on local 
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disputes, but in places the role of the panchayats was more varied so that they were also 
responsible for collecting and keeping important non-revenue records. In the hill 
districts of Kangra and Kulu, for example, specialist councils maintained records of 
marriage payments, and whose approval was necessary in the annulment of marriages, 
and in transfer payments (harjana) in the case of remarriage of women, etc.vii. The 
colonial state viewed the panchayats with great scepticism, but as I explain below, for a 
host of reasons found it difficult to either ignore them or get rid of them altogether.  
The process of instituting any credible form of colonial legal government in the region 
was long-drawn out, one which both tested and at the same time helped to articulate the 
state’s disposition towards the culture-question. When Punjab was first annexed in 
1846, in a move to signal the advent of the new regime, all panchayats were summarily 
made illegal across the province, and people were encouraged to take their disputes to 
the newly instituted state courts. But this was not as straightforward as the colonial 
state might have initially anticipated. In the first decade of colonial rule in Punjab, the 
new laws and institutions proved either too unpopular (as in the case of the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP), where jirgah or tribal councils held sway), or too popular, 
and thereby becoming inundated by the volume of litigation, especially in the Cis-Sutlej 
areas. The Cis-Sutlej area was first to witness a surge in the value of land as a result of 
the spread of irrigation. At the same time, growing and unprecedented levels of rural 
indebtedness gave rise to large-scale unregulated transfers of land, resulting in high 
volumes of litigation (Bhattacharya 1985; Islam 1995; Kapila 2003). Whilst there was 
complete non-recognition of the juridical authority of the state by the people in the 
NWFP, in the case of the Cis-Sutlej area, the state’s inadequacies to deal with the 
consequences of its own policies and interventions were first revealed at the level of 
institutions. In order to tide over the crises of legitimacy as well as growing 
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litigiousness, panchayats were made legal in 1869 and were given the responsibility of 
adjudicating on local disputes.viii But the challenge posed by shared juridical authority 
did not go amiss and so, once again, in 1899 the colonial state de-recognised the judicial 
capacities and capabilities of the all such councils on grounds of their processual opacity 
and lack of moral integrity, thereby deepening the gulf between the domains of state law 
and prevailing cultural norms.ix  
The government tried to address this gulf through a two-pronged solution. It first put in 
place resources to extend the state judicature to every locality. More entry-level courts 
in towns and qasbas were created in order to increase the reach of and access to the 
state judiciary. The expansion of the judiciary was accompanied by the appropriation of 
local jurisprudence within the state juridical regime. It also resulted in the recognition of 
panchayats as and where they existed, and allocating to them jurisdiction over certain 
kinds of affairs that were deemed ‘customary’. This required clarifying and codifying 
what was meant by ‘customary’. The incorporation of local jurisprudence within the 
state juridical framework led to the inscription and codification of local norms and 
practices in compendia of rules and regulations to be used by the state courts for 
jurisprudential reference (eg. Ellis 1917; Middleton 1919; Roe and Rattigan 1895; 
Tupper 1881).  
In other parts of British India, such matters were the subject of personal law (i.e. 
governed by religious tenets). But the area that stretched from the North West Frontier 
Province to Delhi was recognised as a region where religious codes did not necessarily 
find resonance in the daily habits of people.  
‘The Punjab is unique in one particular respect [...]. The primary rule of Civil 
Judicature as to all the important personal relations and as to rights of property 
in land amongst the rural classes (who form the bulk of the population) is 
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Customary Law, and not, as elsewhere in India, the Hindu and the Muhammadan 
Laws, which here are of secondary importance, though these also have to be 
administered.”x  
Since tribal, community and local rules were seen to have greater influence, the state 
found it necessary to systematise these local laws. There was great debate on whether 
the axis of variability of custom lay at the level of group or at the level of territory. In 
keeping with the ethnological imagination of the time, the locus of culture was seen to 
be territory and therefore district-wise manuals of customary law were compiled for the 
use as jurisprudential reference in the adjudication of disputes in courts (Bhattacharya 
1996; Kapila 2003). These manuals remained in use until the Constitution came into 
force in 1950, following Independence. 
In collecting and publishing several compendia of local customary law in Punjab, the 
state at once signaled the discrepancy and the distance between legal and cultural 
norms. Even more importantly, it abjured its responsibility in resolving this dissonance 
by separating out two distinct realms of influence. Whilst it [the colonial state] would 
hold juridical sway over matters of general interest and criminal activity, other matters 
that were deemed of “ordinary occurrence” (such as marriage, inheritance), were to be 
governed by people’s own rules – a convention that continued until Independence.xi The 
existence of parallel jurisdictions of state, religious and customary law made for 
opportunistic assumption of variable subject positions by Punjab litigants and typically, 
in colonial Punjab, people tended to litigate on the basis of the most expedient 
jurisdiction for their case. Whilst it is not possible to go over the details of the debates 
surrounding the recognition of custom by law in colonial Punjab here, suffice it to say 
that due to the fact that it was never formally codified but was ‘legally recognised’ for 
reference in courts, custom was never a stable category. In fact, it became ossified over 
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time not as a consequence of its inscription, but rather through repeated litigation and 
through the subsequent emergence of regional case-law (see Kapila 2003: Chapter 4). 
The colonial state thus addressed the question of culture in the region by first 
recognising it as custom, and contained its realm of influence by its incorporation within 
state law. 
 
Non-recognition 
The relationship between law and culture changed once again when the Constitution 
coming into force after Independence, and particularly with the promulgation of the 
Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession Act in 1955 and 1956 respectively.  All 
matters hitherto regarded as of “ordinary occurrence, or customary”, were brought 
under one single jurisdiction of an all-India law, in stark contrast to not just the 
prevailing norms but also prevailing jurisprudence. This move towards achieving legal 
universalism as an important strategy for nation-making, has been examined to some 
extent with respect to the debates surrounding the incommensurability between 
Uniform, Civil and Personal Codes (eg. Das 1997; Mody 2008). However, its effects on 
the structuring principles north Indian society has yet to receive any systematic 
attention – to which I now turn. 
The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 and the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 are a 
fragmentary and watered down version of a more radical and comprehensive Hindu 
Code Bill, the promulgation of which had caused much political and social upheaval.xii 
The Bill emerged out of the recommendations of the Rau Committee set up in 1941, to 
review the Women’s Rights to Property Act of 1937, a controversial statute in its own 
days (Uberoi 2002). The two Acts were feared for the rupture they were potentially 
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going to cause within Hindu society. Most notably, whilst the Hindu Succession Act came 
to be opposed for its potential to alter the bond between brothers and sisters once the 
sister became a rightholder in her natal property (Nasiruddin 1949: 21), the Hindu 
Marriage Act was seen by some as merely as license for indiscriminate sexual activity 
and therefore as a threat to existing moral values (Chatterjee 1954) These and other 
capacities of the Acts to reform, reshape and reorder Hindu society are have been 
scrutinised by scholars for their role in the changed household composition (Uberoi 
2002), the project of nationalism and developmentalism (Majumdar 2009: 206-238), 
and gender relations in postcolonial India (Kishwar: 1994; Majumdar 2009; Parasher 
1992). Though these studies are diverse in emphasis and persuasion, they hold in 
common a sociological or a socio-historical reading of the Acts and their effects on 
Hindu society. Due to this, whilst they illuminate the changed nature of the Hindu 
household and the gendered character of nationalism and postcolonial development, 
they are unable to throw light on the structural features of their effectsxiii. I suggest that 
shifting the vantage point from the sociological underpinnings and manifestations of 
these Acts to their entailed anthropology of kinship and personhood allows an aperture 
on the unexamined aspects of the relationship between law and culture in 
contemporary India.  
 
As observed earlier, when the colonial state marked out a legally distinct sphere called 
the customary, it at once signalled the gap between cultural and legal norms, as well as 
its inability or disinclination to resolve the tension arising from this gap. The 
postcolonial life and status of this gap has been of a different order, in that it has 
remained mostly unacknowledged. It is noteworthy that the Constituent Assembly (the 
body responsible for drafting the Constitution for postcolonial India) did not consist of a 
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single member who was either mandated, or then advocated the recognition of 
customary and/or local laws, or indeed the Dharmashastras, or classical legal texts 
(Galanter 1972: 55). In staying close to the motto of ‘Unity in Diversity’, Constitutional 
law acknowledged the heterogeneity in matters of ‘ordinary occurrence’ by 
promulgating religion-based personal codes along with the homogenous All India civil 
code. The primary site of difference thus came to be religion and variability along the 
axis of locality did not find recognition within Constitutional jurisprudence. This not 
only meant the non-recognition of colonial customary laws but also the north-south 
divide in Hindu kinship rules (see Uberoi 2002).  
The prevailing hope was that over time, familiarity with new legal institutions as well as 
new legal norms (laws) would end in the closing in of the gap and the emergence of a 
new legal consciousness which was more in consonance with the new ideals.  This 
ostensibly non-interventionist approach was part of a more general disposition of 
optimism surrounding the fate of the postcolonial national community and the advent of 
modernity and was not restricted to the domestic realm. The then ten-year timeframe 
for reservations (or, positive discrimination), the non-enumeration of caste in 
successive censuses, the apathy of the political left towards matters of religion, are some 
prominent examples of the hopes vested in the promise of (state-driven) modernity on 
the one hand and of the salutary disregard of the culture-question on the other in 
independent India. It is this non-intervention and non-acknowledgement of the 
conditions created by the diluted Hindu Code Bill that can be seen as the genesis of the 
most recent battle between law and culture that khaps are currently waging, as the next 
section outlines. 
https://doi.org/10.18742/pub01-040 
 
This is an open access work published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 16 
 
Towards an anthropology of reform 
Gender and family relations are regarded as the major axes of reform that the Hindu 
Marriage Act of 1955 and the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 both by the lawmakers and 
in scholarship (Kishwar 1994; Majumdar 2009). By outlawing polygamy and by 
introducing the legal possibility of divorce amongst all Hindus, including upper caste 
men and women, the Hindu Marriage Act radically altered the legal legibility of the 
Hindu conjugal unit. But in terms of kinship, it was the Hindu Succession Act that was 
the more significant of the two. It gave primacy to the conjugal unit as opposed to the 
joint household composed of male collaterals in succession, and for the first time 
bestowed women with the right to inherit property as equal heirs – whether as wives or 
as daughters. As is evident, this was a completely new way of imagining not only how 
property and wealth were to be held, distributed and devolved in the family, but more 
significantly, how people must relate to one another within and outside kinship. These 
laws were formulated to usher in – as they did indeed – a new society underpinned by a 
firm belief in equity and equality, where gender and family relations needed to undergo 
radical reform. The sites of reform were not new per se, but what distinguished the Acts 
from similar efforts undertaken either by colonial officials or by anticolonial nationalists 
was the scale and scope of transformation entailed in them. These were not examples of 
piecemeal legislation targeted at isolated social practices (cf. sati, widow remarriage, 
age of consent, land alienation, etc), but were a very conscious and comprehensive 
rewriting of the grammar of relatedness in north Indian Hindu society. 
 
The intent of these two Acts was not misplaced. But the rhetoric on which their 
promulgation was premised deeply influenced the nature of their unfolding in 
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subsequent years in at least two important ways, neither of which has been examined 
sufficiently in either public debate or indeed in scholarship. First, the Hindu Code Bill 
and the eventual two Acts gave the appearance of giving birth to a new coda to arrange 
matters of daily occurrence. This was not altogether a false appearance, for these were 
indeed new ways of imagining the working of the Hindu household. However, these Acts 
had indirectly drawn on classical texts, or at least on upper caste sensibilities (Kapila 
2003; 2004; Uberoi 2002). The iteration of newness was understandable because 
asserting rupture with the past was rhetorically necessary to ensure the success of the 
reformist agenda. But rupture and its attendant rhetoric disallowed an explicit tackling 
of the culture question and in particular its relation to law, even in a germane moment 
like that presented by the debates surrounding the Hindu Code Bill. Secondly the state – 
and law by extension – did not have any discursive or political ground to articulate its 
disengagement from or disavowal of the culture question. This was because unlike the 
colonial state, independent India could hardly claim non-intervention on the ground of 
an ostensible sovereignty of the domestic sphere (cf. Chatterjee 1993). In the all-
encompassing self-image of Unity in Diversity, there was no such aspect culture that 
could be disavowed as not one’s own by the nation-state. To do so would imply an 
undermined sovereignty of the nation-state. Moreover, these new laws were couched 
less in the spirit of non-intervention and more in the belief in reform. Therefore, aspects 
of custom (and culture by extension) had to be either declared repugnant and/or 
outmoded and de-recognised (as in the case of polygamy), or had to be sidestepped 
altogether in non-acknowledgement and non-recognition. The notion of reform was key 
here, for it produced the Acts as the deliverance of the anticolonial agenda and could 
thus be deployed to battle the contrarians with unassailable legitimacy. As a result, 
culture begot a fudging in postcolonial law and both its content and its force, 
particularly in relation to law, were never explicitly dealt with or indeed resolved. 
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This non-acknowledgement and non-resolution of the gap between cultural and legal 
norms in domestic matters had a profound and a more fundamental effect in the 
following decades, the roots of which lay in the way the new generative grammar of the 
Hindu relatedness embedded in these two Acts. Whilst the Hindu Marriage Act reduced 
the conjugal unit to a monogamous one, the Hindu Succession Act reconfigured the 
principles and pattern of inheritance, and also re-imagined familial relations from the 
vantage point of the new heirs. The legal categories of kin produced in and through 
these Acts (‘wife’, ‘son’, ‘sister’, etc.) bore at best nominal resemblance to their cultural 
counterparts not least because in their transcription of kinship terminology, the 
prevalent descriptive kinship system was rendered into a classificatory system. The new 
laws failed to produce the complexity of relationality that is fundamental to kinship. 
These changes were not merely of academic import, especially when these new forms of 
sociality and society combined with prevailing dominant norms in the new structuration 
of north Indian society, the consequences were entirely unanticipated and went mostly 
unacknowledged, as explained below. 
 
The models of the family and household inhered within the Acts were borrowed from 
their western counterparts bore a deep agnatic bias. The motor of Hindu society on the 
other hand is primarily driven by alliance rather than descent. Much of the work of 
culture and society in India revolves around a horizontal axis rather than a vertical one 
– arranging marriages, keeping and marking ritual distance, etc. Marriage is not only the 
central feature of kinship structures in India but the very nature of this work is 
intimately connected to the production of the principles of caste hierarchy. As Louis 
Dumont writes, ‘Marriage dominates the Hindu’s social life, and plays a large part in his 
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religion […] It is the most prestigious family ceremony, and at various social levels 
constitutes the main occasion on which the greatest number of members of the caste 
and persons gather together […] By its nature, marriage constitutes to a large measure 
the link between the domain of caste and that of kinship […]’ (Dumont 2009: 109-110). 
Thus, in north India the production of kinship and hierarchy are intimately linked. 
Furthermore, as Dumont remarks elsewhere, in north India the twin interdictions 
against the reversal in the direction of exchange of women and secondly against 
patrilateral cross-cousin marriage are logical elaboration of the wider principles of caste 
hierarchy: ‘Caste [ ] invades the sphere of kinship in such a way that we cannot speak 
with any rigour of a ‘kinship system’ as such. […] The hypergamous model replaces a 
kinship element and allows the whole to keep a similar form’ (Dumont 1993:100).  For 
these reasons, it is impossible to disentangle the structures of kinship from those of 
caste in north India, and any reform aimed at one will have implications for the other. So 
it was in the case of the Hindu Code Bill and its derivative Acts. Based in the 
commitment to the wider principle of equality underpinning the Constitution, the Hindu 
Succession Act and the Hindu Marriage Act had a deep effect on not just the structure of 
north Indian kinship but on its very foundational principles. In making the newly 
narrowed conjugal unit and its direct descendants as primary heirs to property and 
bestowing them with ownership of hitherto unavailable equal dispositional rights, the 
Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession Act altered the principles of relationality 
in north India, and at once reversed the motor of Indian society. In their unfolding, the 
two Acts grammatically altered north Indian kinship from descriptive to classificatory, 
and shifted its motor from alliance and placed a hitherto unprecedented weight on 
descent. The clue to these shifts is to be found in a number of changes that have taken 
place in north India and are sometimes all too hastily explained away under bulky 
rubrics like modernity, globalization, sanskritisation, etc. The effects of this shift, 
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coupled with the fact that it went largely unacknowledged and unarticulated, are 
altogether profound – and as in the case of khaps, violent, as the next section elaborates.  
 
Khaps and the clatter of culture 
Let us remind ourselves of what is at issue as far as the khaps or caste councils are 
concerned. In the main, khaps have increasingly gained force by issuing retributory 
diktats against ‘bad’ or mis-marriages (inter-caste, endogamous, intra-local), none of 
which is an invalid form of marriage in the eyes of the law. In addition, these councils of 
patriarchs have petitioned the Indian state to amend the Hindu Marriage Act to reflect 
their demands. What has posed as a special challenge to the state is their growing 
popular and political influence and the perpetration of violence at their behest. Let us 
also remind ourselves about the region where khap panchayats are most influential and 
where the rate of the so-called honour-killings is on the increase. The region comprises 
mainly of Haryana, western Uttar Pradesh and Delhi has been marked by at least two 
distinct waves of affluence in the last fifty years, both of which are tied to the increased 
value of land.xiv In the first instance, the region was amongst the primary and significant 
beneficiaries of the Green Revolution in the 1950s-60’s that saw an unprecedented 
growth in the rural economy of the area, and a section of the rural population flushed 
with new wealth. Commentators have elaborated on the relationship between economic 
growth and new sociological developments, in particular the dwindling sex-ratio in the 
region, which currently stands at 850 girls for every 1000 boys (Kaur 2010; Khanna 
2010).xv The rise of khap violence is thus also sometimes attributed to the paucity of 
young women in the region of marriageable age (Kaur 2010).  However, neither the 
adverse sex ratio nor the phenomenon of a large proportion of young men of 
marriageable age being unmarried in the region is an entirely recent development and 
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that both these features of north Indian society are linked to the rising value of land and 
the rising political power of landowners (Chowdhry 2007: 253-54). I want to suggest 
that although very important, political economy alone cannot explain the rising 
influence of khaps being witnessed today. The changes taking place in the structuring of 
north Indian kinship need to be paid attention to. 
 
The reversal of the motor of society from alliance to descent has had a profound effect in 
this area. The work of society has shifted, in that there is a new emphasis placed on 
descent as opposed to alliance. This does not imply that the work of alliance has been 
altogether abandoned, but that social institutions and efforts are now geared more 
towards achieving the objective of producing descent rather than alliance. Thus, from 
arranging marriages (or circulating women) as a motor of moving society forward, 
increasing its thickness and intensifying the density of relations, the new laws have 
managed to engender a recalibration of this effort so that the focus is heavily weighed in 
favour of producing heirs (or in other words descendants).  As a result, social value is no 
longer being produced simply in and through establishing, or reinforcing horizontal 
networks of alliance, but is now being contested, if not superseded by its production 
along the vertical axis of descent. The evidence is most clear from the key shift in this 
area, where the region’s well-established male-child preference has achieved an ever 
sharper edge in the preceding decades (John et al 2011).xvi The need to produce male 
heirs has now achieved almost an unprecedented level of autonomy so that it has 
become a goal in itself. Social and reproductive technologies have aided in freeing it 
from the conjugal complex. And even though the Hindu Succession Act produces sons 
and daughters as equal heirs or descendants, these technologies along with the policy 
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imperative of the two-children norm have combined only to further the dominance of 
male child preference (Kaur 2010; Khanna 2010).  
 
But what is interesting and to an extent remains unaccounted for is that the scarcity of 
women in the event of the lowered sex-ratio has not yielded a change (if not reversal) in 
the traffic and direction of marriage payments, as it might have been hoped, if not 
presumed. Rather, in a bizarre development, two forms of marriage have resurfaced 
after nearly a century – marriage by abduction/capture, and child marriage. The former 
development, or marriage by abduction is now nearly a decade old, and technically not 
really a marriage, in that it is contractual ‘renting’ of the womb of women abducted from 
places as far as Bangladesh for the explicit purpose of producing a male heir, whose 
services are most likely to be terminated once the mission is accomplished (Kaur 2004). 
The abductee has no rights in that household beyond the agreed payment for childbirth. 
Child marriage, on the other hand, is being touted by khap patriarchs and even by some 
social services as a preferred solution to producing the right kind of male heirs as well 
as the solution to keeping the circulation of young women in control (Siwach 2010).xvii 
In this complex, the paucity of women in the community, which should have led to an 
increase in their value, a change some may have hoped for, and possibly an eventual 
reversal in the direction of marriage payments, is near impossible to come into being. In 
the end, gender – that much vaunted axis of reform and the vector of domestic equality 
enshrined in the Hindu Code Bill and the subsequent Marriage and Succession Acts, does 
not, and dare I say cannot and will not correct its imbalance in the long run. The reason 
for this lies in the way social reform and its axes were envisaged in law and the Hindu 
Code Bill in particular, as the next section makes clear. 
  
https://doi.org/10.18742/pub01-040 
 
This is an open access work published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 23 
A theft of rights 
In discussing the relationship between law and culture thus far, I have addressed some 
of the strategies and conditions through and under which culture and cultural practices 
have challenged the legitimacy of Indian state law in recent times. If community 
patriarchs have found culture as a conduit to assert their political and social clout by 
taking on the law, or demonstrating its alien qualities, then in this war of attrition, law 
on its part has reasserted its position as being a prosthetic extension of the paternalistic 
Indian state. In such a self-positioning, law becomes, and presents itself as, not just an 
arbiter or guarantor, but also as the provider of all those things that culture could not or 
did not provide. Chief amongst these are rights of equity and equality, hitherto 
unavailable to the citizenry, at least in and through culture. In doing so, law becomes a 
critical medium through which the framework of rights becomes the lingua franca for 
comprehending not just the political but social life as well. But as Marilyn Strathern has 
cautioned us, it is imperative to de-naturalise the language of rights, for, ‘[a] vocabulary 
that turns on the deprivation of ‘rights’ must entail premises about a specific form of 
property. To assert rights against others implies a sense of legal ownership’ (Strathern 
1988: 142). Even though Strathern’s warning came against certain Marxist-feminist 
readings of gender relations in Melanesia and specifically with regard to the question of 
ownership of the product of one’s labour, it is nevertheless salutary in understanding 
the persistent incommensurability between law and culture and why at this point in 
time and in this particular matter the two end up talking past each other. 
 
Imputed in the framing of itself as the provider of all that which is lacking elsewhere is 
by necessity a restrictive constitution of all other sources of social and political life.  
Seen from the eyes of the law, culture in this all-too powerful framework, then becomes 
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a restriction, one that constrains people from realising the full potential of rights and 
liberties conferred in and through citizenship. Speaking within this framework or in its 
support, sixty years after the Constitution first came into force, at such moments of 
serious challenge from the other side, law and its liberal defendants, wittingly or 
unwittingly, position culture as a thief, as one that takes away from society all that which 
law has bestowed. In a neat reversal, law becomes the giver of the gift of rights to its 
citizens, and culture becomes the thief or the misappropriator. If we locate ‘theft’ in the 
realm of exchange, then it sits at odds with ‘gift’, in fact almost in opposition to it. Gifts 
propel exchange. But, in as much as exchange is written into the gift, so is the greyness 
of ownership.xviii Theft, on the other hand, disrupts exchange, calls a halt to it, and 
momentarily disturbs the logic of flow, precisely because it disputes and appropriates 
ownership – not through a process of exchange (whether equal, reciprocal, or 
asymmetric), but by its disruption, its end. It seeks to end the greyness of ownership to 
bring it within the realm of black and white clarity. The theft of rights then is the 
greatest crime committed by culture, for it stops certain forms of symbolic exchange – in 
this case of rights and obligations between the citizen and the state to continue, or even 
come into being at all. But what kind of theft, if any does law commit on culture?  
 
It is here that Strathern’s caution comes to bear upon the argument. To talk of rights 
that law has bestowed and which subsequently culture takes away in the event of 
efficacious khap violence is to first aver to the existence of those rights in the first place 
and the location of these rights in the form of legal ownership of people have in 
themselves and with regard to other people. It is when the edifice of rights-talk is 
spliced apart at this angle that the consequences of the original non-acknowledgement 
of culture by law become evident. Indian law recognises culture and cultural difference 
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in very particular forms. The greatest acknowledgement of cultural difference 
recognised and defended by the Indian Constitution is at the level of religion and the 
existence of the various Personal Codes (Hindu, Muslim, Christian) are proclaimed as 
testimony to the defense of difference by law in India (Bajpai 2010; Bhargava 1998). It is 
another matter that its impetus is derived not so much from the recognition of 
difference but from the Constitutional guarantee the right to equality. But what needs to 
be underscored in the Constitutional guarantee of Personal Codes is the swift and sealed 
conclusion that the recognition of difference has been completed or is complete in this 
one step. The optic of spirit-level that pervades the Indian legal imagination deems that 
anything that is different can and must always be seen as that which needs to be brought 
up to that level playing field (Chakrabarty 2002: 90). For example, in the landmark 
overturning in 2009 of Article 377 of the Indian Penal Code that criminalized 
homosexuality since colonial times, the judgement was based on the defense of legal 
minorities  - in this case sexual minorities, rather than on a right to difference per se.xix 
This numerical and statistical idiom of equality in Indian law is well-noted (Bajpai 2011; 
Bhargava 1998; Chakrabarty 2002). What remains undertheorised is its monadic, as 
opposed to the relational calculus of subjectivity. As in case of the HSA and the HMA, the 
law purports to suffuse the individual with rights (and obligations) but does so in a 
unitary or atomistic fashion so that it is the event or the moment of becoming or 
unbecoming that kind of person (wife, heir, daughter, widower, divorcee) that becomes 
the focus of juridical attention and elaboration, leeching away from it the complexity 
entailed in the relation per se. The husband-wife relation, for example, is not just a 
relationship between the man and the woman, but also encompasses and is embedded 
within an array of relations that go beyond the two individuals concerned. It includes 
and is constituted by the ‘obligations entailed in having kinfolk’ (Strathern 2004: 208). 
In other words, composite or dividual personhood cannot be acknowledged or 
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reproduced through the Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession Act, not least 
because like Marshall Sahlins, law in India categorises dividual personhood as ‘pre-
modern’ (Sahlins 2011: 13).  The subjects of the Hindu Marriage Act and Succession Act 
are monadic individuals, rather than a ‘composite site of social relations’ (Strathern 
1988:13). This discrepancy between legal subjectivity and culturally defined kin 
category also explains why individuals opportunistically assume expeditious (or liberal) 
subject positions as litigants and revert to cultural type before and after court 
appearances, or decision-events, as Humphrey (2008: 368) calls them, especially in the 
case of family disputes (Kapila 2004; Mir Husseini 2000). But it also throws light on why 
sixty years after these laws were first enacted and equality of status guaranteed as a 
fundamental right under the Indian Constitution, sociological axes of difference (eg. 
gender) remain mostly undisturbed beyond their formal lives, especially in the domain 
of kinship.  The adverse sex-ratio and its expanding territory of influence, as recently 
pointed out by John (2011), is but only one concrete manifestation of this discrepancy. 
In conclusion 
In commonplace and some scholarly understandings of the conflict between law and 
culture, culture is routinely positioned as a constraining influence, as taking away from 
people what law has bestowed on them, or inhibiting their access to these gifts. The 
public aspirations of law, especially in the case of India, prevent a routine interrogation 
of its countervailing force because these aspirations are inherently formulated in the 
future tense. The promise of equality for all in an underdetermined notion of the future 
therefore presents itself as a powerful, and for most part incontrovertible proposition, 
whose attraction few can deny in a milieu overdetermined by hierarchy.  
In fact, it is often the functioning, or “implementation”, of law rather than its content and 
force, that usually comes for criticism. Injustice too is not seen to issue forth from the 
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nature of the law itself (Derrida 1990) but from the indolence or slovenliness of its 
executors. Only in the event of an explicit challenge fielded by representatives of cultural 
norms, for example in the famous case of Shah Bano,xx or indeed in the current round of 
khap inspired violence, is the public aspirations of law tentatively superseded by the 
question mark placed on the force of law in Indian society. Khaps appear doubly 
restrictive in this context: neither are they democratic, that is, based in equality, nor do 
they defend it. Moreover, their emancipatory potential and epistemological status is 
undermined by the fact that cultural norms are not seen to be products of systematic 
expertise in the way law is, and neither are there recognizable professions attached to 
them (Galanter 1972: 61).  
But it is when we turn the argument on its head that the restrictions placed by law on 
culture reveal themselves in two forms: one is the ways in which very particular forms 
of subjectivity find recognition in law, and secondly how its monadic calculus pares 
down relationality. The narrow field of vision for recognition and the politics it gives 
birth to is well noted in scholarship on indigenous communities. Elizabeth Povinelli 
amongst others has discussed at length the ‘gridlocking’ of indigenous bodies and 
culture by the Australian state on two levels: one, the bestowing recognition only on the 
so-called non-repugnant indigenous cultural practices, and secondly the bestowing of 
legal recognition only on those that can be demonstrated to have an unbroken 
continuity with the past (Povinelli 2006: 227; See also Clifford 1988). Indigenous 
communities, on their part have been noted to draw on culture as an expedient 
‘resource’ in order to gain recognition from the state (Yudice 2003: 19). But what we 
have in the case of the law in India is a very different kind of gridlocking, where culture 
is rendered anything but expedient. Law is premised on the rupture with the past and 
therefore any continuity with the past is precisely what law cannot address or 
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recognize, especially in matters of “ordinary occurrence”.  In order to redescribe and 
gain any purchase on the relationship between law and culture we will therefore need to 
address both sets of constraints. We will need to address the reasons not for the conflict 
between law and culture but following Derrida for their incommensurability that gives 
the appearance of hostility (Derrida 1990: 951). And for that, we will need to examine 
culture seriously and not just expediently – that is, neither as a resource, nor as gridlock.   
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